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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of lJtah 
WILLIAM D. JACKSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SPANISH FORK WEST FIELD 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a cor~ 
poration; SPANISH FORK SOUTH 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corpo-
ration; SPANISH FORK SOUTH-
EAST IRRIGATION COMPANY, a 
corporation; THE SALEM IRRIGA-
TION and CANAL COMPANY, a 
corporation; SPANISH FORK EAST 
BENCH IRiRIGA TION and MANU-
FACTURING COMPANY, a corpora-
tion; LAKE SHORE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY; ED WATSON, State En-
gineer of the State of Utah, a corpo-
ration; and WAYNE FRANCIS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 7450 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
It is understood that this Court has granted a rehear-
ing in the above entitled cause for the sole purpose of de-
termining whether the decree below should be modified as 
to the use of water during the non-irrigation season. 
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This brief is filed pursuant to permission granted by 
the Court for the writers to appear Amicus Curiae. 
FACTS 
A complete statement of the facts, or a detailed re-
sponse to the statements of ather parties, seems unneces-
sary and would be repetitious. It may be of assistance, 
however, to refer to the record concerning possible use of 
water by plaintiff during the non-irrigation season. 
The trial court's Finding of Fact state that the prede-
cessors of plaintiff went upon Thistle Creek at the head of 
the West Jackson Ditch, and "diverted from said stream 
through said ditch to, and upon, the said lands one cubic 
foot per second of the flow thereof and used the same upon 
the said lands for irrigation of about nineteen acres thereof 
and for stockwatering, culinary and domestic purposes 
throughout the entire year of each and every year; that 
such use was a beneficial use." (Finding 11, pp. 100-101 of 
record) .. 
The Decree awarded to plaintiff the "right to the use 
of a continuous flow throughout the entire year of one cubic 
foot per second of the waters of Thistle Creek 
to be used upon said lands for the irrigation of about nine-
teen acres thereof and for stockwatering, domestic and cul-
inary purposes " (Para. 1 of Judgment, p. 105 
of record). 
The evidence, and particularly that of the plaintiff, 
deals primarily with the irrigation season, and the condi-
tion of the well during that season, and to a limited extent 
with stockwatering in the spring and the fall. Without ar-
guing the view that this evidence is insufficient to show an 
adverse user of one second foot of water even in the irri-
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gation season, we refer specificaly to the evidence which 
seems to touch upon a possible use outside the regular irri-
gation season. 
The plaintiff testified that when irrigating the south 
end of Parcel B, he observed differences in the water in his 
well with respect to being fresh or brackish (Tr. 14). After 
the water was turned off on the 12th of July, 1948, he ob-
served that the water began to recede about one inch a 
day (Tr. 15). Prior to July twenty-eighth, the water was 
stale and the hot water tap had an odor (Tr. 17). Later 
in August, he made an observation after applying water on 
the land (Tr. 19). He observed the effect on the well of 
applying water on August twentieth (Tr. 22). He testi-
fied only in general that the water in the ditch was used 
continuously all the year around, except for cleaning of the 
ditch or clogs in the ditch (Tr. 31). There was talk of keep-
ing the land growing and green (Tr. 33). He further tes-
tified that he watered stock (Tr. 37) and ran sheep, cattle 
and horses, during spring, fall and summer (Tr. 38). Live-
stock grazing in the summer, spring and fall was mentioned 
(Tr. 41). In his early years, he testified, he observed the 
water, but only in the summer (Tr. 52.). 
Mr. Mariah H. Shepherd mentioned seeing ice, mud and 
stuff in the ditch in the winter months (Tr. 105). 
Joseph H. Shepherd said he didn't remember seeing 
the ditch without water unless it was in the wintertime and 
then there was generally ice and you couldn't tell. " I think 
he had a little to run through for his cattle" (Tr. 122). He 
said there was water in the summertime (Tr. 123), and in 
the spring (Tr. 123), but didn't mention the situation in the 
fall. He said the last irrigation of the grain crop was may-
be July (Tr. 130). 
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Earl Gardner's testimony was limited to the months 
of July, August and September (Tr. 144-145). George C. 
Jackson's observation was in the summer (Tr. 154). He 
did mention October (Tr. 155 ) and the spring (Tr. 156). 
Alvin L. Jackson observed crops in the summer and saw 
the ditch when he operated sheep in May and June (Tr. 
167); also July, August and September (Tr. 167). David 
A. Mitchell talked about crops. (Tr. 180). T. E. McKean said 
that in the fall, Simmons would pasture the property (Tr. 
194). He mentioned the fall and spring (Tr. 194). He said 
he noticed the smell of the water in the well in August (Tr. 
197). He irrigated grain first about the middle of May. 
In the wintertime he tried to keep water for cattle (Tr. 199). 
Most of the cattle were in the fall and spring (Tr. 206). 
James Hicks testified to watering cattle, but no spe-
cific number and no specific season (Tr. 209). He remem-
bered when the well dried up late in the season but most 
of the time the water was good (Tr. 227). Max DePew 
testified about the ranch from 1930 to 1944. He found that 
the well would go dry if he didn't water around the field 
(Tr. 238). No time in the non-irrigating season was men-
tioned. He said the stream was more or less used for keep-
ing up the well and for stockwatering purposes and it also 
had to be turned out by the house or else the well went dry 
(Tr. 248) . Ole C. Anderson mentioned the cattle in the 
summer and said that the cattle were pastured in the fall 
(Tr. 262). He said there were cattle "even in the late sum-
mer" (Tr. 285). 
Dr. Farnsworth made his principal examination Sep-
tember eighteenth and did not purport to cover conditions 
in the non-irrigation season. He gave his opinion of the 
water requirements particularly with reference to "the 
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growing season-June, July and August, the heavy growing 
season" (Tr. 324). With respect to the nineteen acres he 
said he believed a second foot for irrigating the forage there 
could be beneficially used "during the season after high 
water" (Tr. 335) .. He talked about keeping the pasture 
vegetation green (Tr. 337). He admitted that according 
to standards acccepted by the State Engineer, one second 
foot would take care of sixty acres (Tr. 337). He made a 
computation of the requirements for water, that is, during 
the period ordinarily from June to the first of September 
(Tr. 339). But he said that water needed before that time 
"they ordinarily have stored in the soil during the snow 
and rainfall during the wet period" (Tr. 339). He said or-
dinarily they are coming to the end of the growing season 
by September first (Tr. 340). He· would say that the wa-
ter could be beneficially used from May first (Tr. 340). 
ARGUMENT 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUS-
TAIN, AND THE RECORD AND APPLICABUE LAW 
DO NOT JUSTIFY, THE A WARD TO PLAINTIFF OF 
ONE SECOND FOOT OF WATER OR ANY OTHER 
AMOUNT DURING THE NON-IRRIGATION SEASON. 
Within the limited area of reconsideration which the 
Court has specified, we submit that the decree below should 
be modified to deny the use of water in question to plain-
tiff during the non-irrigation season because there is no evi-
dence that the plaintiff beneficially used the water for stock-
watering or other domestic use during the non-irrigating 
season, and particularly, there is no competent evidence 
from which the Court could fix any quantity or period of 
right, plaintiff having failed to sustain his burden in this 
respect; there is no evidence of any beneficial use of water 
for culinary purposes during the non-irrigating season, 
there being a complete failure of proof that the presence of 
water through the ditch in the non-irrigating season had 
any effect on the well or that this was a use that the law 
should recognize; there is no other possible justification of 
the award of any water to plaintiff during the non-irrigat-
ing season, plaintiff having failed to show any use adverse 
to defendants or any beneficial use whatsoever. We there-
fore believe that, as a matter of law, it should be deter-
mined that there was no acquisition of any right by adverse 
user or otherwise during the non-irrigation season. 
While the foregoing statement of facts may not con-
tain every reference to specific times when water use in the 
borderline period or outside of the irrigation season is men-
tioned, it contains, we believe, most of the references, to-
gether with other references limiting specifically the tes-
timony to the irrigation season, and is representative of the 
entire record on the point. None of the references to times 
outside the irrigation season are fixed as to quantity, 
amount, or particular use. We think that it is fair to say 
that there is a total lack of any competent evidence of an 
adverse beneficial use of a second foot of water in the non-
irrigation season, or for that matter, any amount. The most 
that can be said is that a few witnesses mentioned that in 
the winter there was ice in the ditch and that in the "spring" 
and "fall", cattle were watered from time to time. Cer-
tainly there is no quantity specified or estimated or any 
information from which the court could fix any quantity. 
Where is there any proof of adverse user during the 
non-irrigation period? 
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All of the proof with respect to the well situation re-
lated to the summer months. Except for generalizations, 
which seemed to mean very little, the proof of even diver-
sion during the winter months was almost non-existent. 
There was practically no proof of stockwatering during the 
winter and reference to stockwatering during the "spring" 
and "fall" fell far short of competent proof of adverse user 
for a continuous seven-year period. 
In the winter months the evidence indicated that the 
ditch was frozen over or filled with ice. If the great body 
of snow and ice which covers the surface of this entire 
mountain area during the winter did not take care of the 
well, it is impossible that the turning of water into a frozen 
ditch would do so. We question the entire thesis that it is 
an acceptable use of one second foot of water to turn it 
loose to "'sweeten" or supply a well in order to permit the 
use of an infinitesimal quantity as compared with a second 
foot. That is too wasteful a system to be countenanced in 
this arid region. Yet with respect to the non-irrigation 
season, there is no proof whatsoever that the use of water 
through the ditch was necessary or even desirable from 
the standpoint of the well. Moreover, the same defect in 
proof of adversity which applied to the irrigation season, 
as pointed out in appellants' brief, applies with even greater 
force to the non-irrigation season. 
We shall endeavor to shun as much as possible the repe-
tition of authority and reasoning already presented in ap-
pellants' briefs. By so doing, we do not mean to indicate 
that we do not agree with such arguments and supporting 
authority. We ask leave, however, to emphasize the fol-
lowing legal propositions as applied to the limited point re-
served for reconsideration: 
The presumption is against the acquisition of title by 
adverse use. Clark v. North Cottonwood Irr. & Water Co., 
79 Utah 425, 11 P.2d 300. 
Because of the nature of the right sought to be estab-
lished under the principles of adverse use, the elements con-
stituting it must be proved unequivocally and no doubtful 
inference will suffice. The presumption is against such ac-
quisition. Ephraim Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. Olson, 70 Utah 
95, 258 Pac. 216; Spring Creek Irr. Co. v. Zollingr, et al, 
58 Utah 90, 197 Pac. 737. 
We think there is serious question that the defendant 
established a right to the use of any water by adverse user 
during the irrigation season. But since this matter is out-
side the scope of the question reserved for our reconsidera-
tion at this time, it seems pertinent to point out that even 
though adverse user be established for one period or sea-
son, this does not give the right to a use during other peri-
ods. Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Live-
stock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 643 indicates that an ad-
verse user may establish a right to use water even intermit-
tently according to definite periods and it is not necessary 
that he establish a right to a continuous use. Certainly the 
plaintiff in this case has not established the right to a con-
tinuous use throughout the year. 
It must be that to establish a right by adverse uaer, 
such use must be beneficial for the entire statutory period. 
Beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the limit of all 
rights to the use of water in this state. UCA 1943, Sec. 
100-1-3. 
In the case of Big Cottonwood Lower Canal Co. v. 
Cook, et al 73 Utah 383, 274 Pac. 454, it is pointed out that 
beneficial use is the cardinal principal of water rights. In-
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cidentally, it is interesting to note that while in the instant 
case, there is no proof that any specific quantity was neces-
sary for domestic purposes in the winter months, in the Big 
Cottonwood case the court refers to "satisfactory evidence" 
that five hundred gallons per day was sufficient for domestic 
purposes. A second foot of water flowing for a few minutes 
a day would be more than enough to furnish a family for do-
mestic use if that were necessary. In Jackson's case he had 
a well which would certainly keep sweet in the winter from 
snow and other moisture. There is no evidence that there is 
any problem with the well at all in the winter, or that when 
the ground is frozen, surface water would have any effect 
even though there were a problem. To waste a cubic foot of 
water per second during the non-irrigation season because 
someone claimed that this would keep a well sweet in the 
irrigation season seems unjustified. To run such a stream 
to feed a single well even in the summertime seems highly 
wasteful, since a second foot of water is ordinarily con-
sidered sufficient to supply a fair-sized town with its do-
mestic needs. 
In the case of Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v City of 
Richfield, 84 Utah 107, 34 P.2d 945, this Court commented 
as follows on a record which showed a diversion but was 
silent on the question of beneficial use: (p. 949). 
" . We have a statute which provides that 
'beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the 
limit of all rights to the use of water in this state.' 
Rev. St. Utah, 1933, 100-1-3. Such has been the law 
in this jurisdiction ever since the territory of Utah 
was organized. This court has in numerous cases had 
occasion to apply that law. Among such cases are 
Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 Pac. 1112; Salt 
Lake City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 Pac. 147; Big 
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Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 Utah 569, 
163 Pac. 856; Cleary v. Daniels, 50 Utah 494, 167 Pac. 
820; Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison Highland Canal Co., 
52 Utah 347, 174 Pac. 852; Mt. Olivet Cemetery Assn. 
v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 193, 235 ·Pac. 876; and Big 
Cottonwood Lower Canal Co. v. Cook, 73 Utah 383, 
274 Pac. 454. The mere fact that the City of Richfield 
has for many years diverted water from Cottonwood 
Creek does not give it the right to the use of such wa-
ter nor establish a right thereto . " 
In the case of Cleary v. Daniels, 50 Utah 494, 167 
Pac. 820, it was determined that although a defendant had 
a prior and paramount prescriptive right to use waters of 
a spring for irrigation as against the plaintiff, she had no 
right to the waters except as she put them to a beneficial 
use. Mr. Justice Frick, speaking for the Court, said: (p. 
822). 
" . There is a period of time, therefore, 
between the first day of September of one year and the 
last day of May in the following year that the defend-
ant has not used, does not and cannot use, the waters 
of the spring for any purpose. While it is true that in 
her prayer, as we have seen, she claimed the water of 
the spring for the entire year, yet there is not a word 
of evidence in support of that claim. She therefore 
cannot prevent the plaintiff from using the water when 
she cannot use it. Long on Irrigation, par. 60, p. 108. 
As before stated, therefore, the findings of the court 
and the decree are too sweeping as against the plain-
tiff, and that is especially true with regard to the por-
tion of the decree containing the injunction. While it 
is true that under both the law and the evidence, the 
defendant has a prior and paramount right to use the 
water of the spring as against the plaintiff, yet she has 
no right to the water except as she puts it to a bene-
ficial use. " 
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It is true that the case of Adams v. Portage Irrigation, 
Reservoir & Power Company, 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, rec-
ognized that an individual can obtain by adverse use a right 
to water sheep from a natural stream. In that case the 
number of sheep was fixed definitely over a continuous pe-
riod, the exact months were specified by the witnesses and 
the gallon consumption indicated (p. 655). Even where 
the proof was definite, there was no support given to waste, 
as the defendant was permitted to install a trough, "in the 
interest of further conservation of the very limited water 
supply " For the watering of stock even where 
the proof might indicate an adverse user for specific periods, 
there could be no justification of running a quantity of wa-
ter to waste having no relationship to the water used. A 
second foot of water flowing for a very few minutes would 
supply the needs of a large herd of animals, even though 
proof as to the right were adequate. A small fraction of a 
second foot would ordinarily supply all of the culinary needs 
of a farm community. But not only is there no justification 
for the amount awarded during the non-irrigation season, 
but there is no justification, we believe, for the award 
of any amount whatsoever during such season. In this case 
there is insufficient proof of the acquisition of any stock-
watering rights or domestic or culinary rights whatsoever 
during the non-irrigation season. We do not think there is 
substantial proof during the irrigation season, but certainly 
in the non-irrigation season, the proof of continuity of use, 
the adverse nature of the same, the proof of quantity, that 
of period, and even diversion itself, wholly fail. 
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CONCLUSION 
During the non-irrigation season there is no competent 
evidence of adverse user, and particularly there is no com-
petent evidence of any beneficial use on the part of plain-
tiff. The very basis of a right to water is the beneficial use 
thereof, and if such beneficial use is essential to its approp-
riation and even to its use by the owner after appropria-
tion, it must be essential to the acquisition of a right by ad-
verse use, against which acquisition there are presumptions 
of law. 
To award a year-round right on the evidence before the 
Court would be a departure from our doctrine of beneficial 
use, and to award it upon the basis claimed by the plaintiff 
would bring confusion to the law and great difficulty to 
those seeking to maintain without waste essential water 
rights. If plaintiff can take one second foot from this 
stream on the type of proof before the Court and merely 
because he claims to have made the diversion, a large num-
ber of others in like situation could do the same thing, until 
the entire stream would be substantially depleted, to the 
great prejudice of established rights for power and other-
wise. 
The Findings as to a year-round right are not supported 
by the evidence. The Conclusions and Judgment are not 
sound in this regard. The opinion of this Court should be 
revised so as to deny any water to the plaintiff at least dur-
ing the non-irrigation season. Even then, he would be liber-
ally treated in view of the record before the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON 
Amicus Curiae 
